

15 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Community Security Group

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FROM:

[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT:

Revision of Compartmentation Program

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 12 December 1978, wherein you requested written observations concerning the impact, if any, of the OS Kampiles Report upon the Community.

2. My initial reaction was to submit a negative report because the recommendations in question were not applicable, as written, to the Community; at least those recommendations that pertain to the Personnel and Industrial Security Branch.

3. However, upon reflecting on the matter, I am convinced that these recommendations can be used to improve the SCI Security Program. As you are aware, Paragraph 16 of DCID 1/14 requires that each SIO establish a continuing security program for those individuals who have been granted access to SCI. Even prior to the Boyce-Lee case and the cases in Colorado, I have had severe misgivings over the implementation of Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the DCID. Notwithstanding the fact that considerable attention has been given to the industrial areas since Boyce-Lee, I believe that similar attention should be given to the otherside of the house.

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My feelings in this regard were strengthened as a result of recent attempts by the Security Awareness Working Group to come up with a security education program for the community. During these deliberations, several working group members commented to the effect that their agencies had no continuing security program for persons granted SCI access. Others stated that the continuing security program in their agency was limited to the SCI indoctrination/debriefing and RIP investigation as necessary.

4. I admit that this is a touchy area. However, I am convinced that we cannot ignore it and in this connection recommend that the Investigative Standards Working Group, or an ad hoc working group, be set-up to determine the following:

a. if paragraphs 16 and 17 of DCID 1/14 are being complied with by member agencies and departments;

b. whether, in the opinion of that group, in light of the Kampiles, Boyce-Lee cases, etc., such programs need strengthening, and;

c. if strengthening of the PSI continuing security program is required to make specific recommendations for same for consideration by SECOM principals.

5. In conclusion, it is acknowledged that the tasking of the Security Awareness Working Group will, when and if a program is developed, alleviate the situation. However, I do not feel that we should ignore the issues raised above.

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